Ex ante optima are described for two examples of a monetary model with random meetings and some perfectly monitored people and some nonmonitored people. One example describes optimal in ‡ation; the other describes optimal seasonal policy. Although the numerical examples are in most respects arbitrary, the results are consistent with three general conclusions: if the model is known, then intervention is desirable; even the qualitative aspects of the optimal intervention are not obvious; optimal intervention depends on all the details of the model. The results, therefore, are reminiscent of the conclusions of 'second-best'theory.
Introduction
The work of Ostroy [22] , Townsend [24] , and Kocherlakota [14] initiated the mechanismdesign approach to monetary theory. The goal of that approach is to …nd settings in which money helps to achieve good outcomes-or, in Hahn's teminology, in which money is essential-and to use those settings to study the consequences of monetary and …scal policy. Here, I present two examples that do that. The words attractive and surprising in the title are meant to challenge readers: they should decide whether the model is attractive and whether the results are surprising.
There is one general conclusion that has emerged from the mechanism-design approach to monetary theory: imperfect monitoring, some privacy of the history of individual actions, is necessary for essentiality of money (see Wallace [26] ). However, there are no general necessary and su¢ cient conditions for essentiality of money. Therefore, many monetary models rule out monitoring completely-either implicitly or explicitly-and make other extreme asumptions. 1 Roughly speaking, the following conditions are su¢ cient for essentiality of money: no monitoring, discounting (that is not taken to the limit of no discounting), a large number of agents, some background absence-of-double-coincidence, and no durable objects other than money. While useful for some purposes, such economies have no credit and, somewhat less obviously, no taxation. Indeed, they are best viewed as extreme versions of underground economies. In those respects, they are very special. The absence of credit seems particularly troublesome because the role of central banks is widely viewed to be intervention involving credit.
To get money and credit, we need to have some monitoring-but not so much as to eliminate a role for money. About a dozen years ago, Ricardo Cavalcanti and I (see [5] ) formulated such an intermediate situation by having some exogenous fraction of the population be perfectly monitored, labeled m-people, and having the rest, labeled n-people, be not monitored at all. The model was designed to compare inside (private money) and outside money as alternative monetary systems. Here, I review some work by Alexei Deviatov and me that uses an outside-money version of that model to study optimal policy.
The results below are optima for two arbitrary numerical examples: one geared to …nding optimal in ‡ation; the other geared to …nding optimal seasonal policy. Despite the arbitrariness of those examples, they strongly hint at three general and related conclusions-general in the sense that they should hold for almost all models that give rise to a role for money. First, if the model is known, then intervention is optimal. Second, it is not easy to guess at even the qualitative nature of optimal intervention. Third, the optimum depends on all the details of the model.
Those conclusions are reminiscent of second-best theory; if the …rst-best is unattainablefor example, because some sector of the economy produces unavoidable externalitiesthen optimal policy can call for interventions throughout the economy, interventions that depend on a detailed description of the entire economy. Somewhat similar con-clusions apply to optimal policy in any reasonably robust model that gives rise to a role for money. In such a model, the features of a model that give rise to a role for money make the …rst-best unattainable. As a consequence, some kind of intervention is desirable. However, the nature of the bene…cial intervention depends on the details of the economy and may not be consistent with simple general principles like the Friedman rule or lean-against-the wind.
The environment
The background setting is borrowed from Shi [23] and Trejos-Wright [25] , a purecurrency economy with pairwise meetings at random. Time is discrete and there is a nonatomic measure of people, each of whom maximizes expected discounted utility with discount factor 2 (0; 1). Production and consumption occur in pairwise meetings that occur at random in the following way. Just prior to such meetings, each a person looks forward to being a consumer (a buyer) who meets a random producer (seller) with probability 1=K, looks forward to being a producer who meets a random consumer with probability 1=K, and looks forward to no pairwise meeting with probability 1 (2=K), where integer K 2. The period utility of someone who becomes a consumer and consumes y 2 R + is u(y), where u is strictly increasing, strictly concave, di¤erentiable, and satis…es u(0) = 0. The period utility of someone who becomes a producer and produces y 2 R + is c(y), where c is strictly increasing, convex, and di¤erentiable, and satis…es c(0) = 0. In addition, y = arg max y 0 [u(y) c(y)] exists and is positive. Production is perishable; it is either consumed or lost. 2 In addition, either u is bounded above or c is such that y is bounded above, an assumption that allows us to invoke the principle of one-shot deviations.
People in the model are ex ante identical but the fraction become permanently monitored (m-people), while the rest are permanently nonmonitored (n-people). 3 For m-people, histories and money holdings are common knowledge; for n-people, they are private. However, the monitored status and consumer-producer status of people in a pairwise meeting are common knowledge. And, no one except the planner can commit to future actions.
At each date, there are two stages. The …rst stage has the pairwise meetings just described. There is a second stage at which transfers are made. There is neither production nor consumption at the second stage. Money is uniform and indivisible, and each person's holding of money is limited to be in the set f0; 1g at any time.
The only feasible punishment is permanent banishment of an individual m-person to the set of n-people. Underlying this assumption about punishment is free exit at any time from the set of m-people into the set of n-people and the ruling out of global punishments-like the shutting down of all trade in response to individual defections.
Implementable allocations and the optimum problem
The search for an optimum is limited to allocations that are steady states and are symmetric, where symmetry means that all people in the same situation take the same action, an action that can be a lottery. (In general, lotteries here have the form of a deterministic amount of output exchanged for a probability of getting money.)
The state of the economy entering a date is ( m ; n ), where m 2 [0; ] is the fraction who are m-people with money and n 2 [0; 1 ] is the fraction who are n-people with money. With S = fm; ng f0; 1g, the state of a meeting is an element in S S, where the …rst component is the state of the producer and the second is that of the consumer. The planner chooses ( m ; n ), trades in meetings (as a function of the states of the producer and the consumer in the meeting), and second-stage transfers.
The planner is constrained by the steady-state restriction and by self-selection constraints that follow from the speci…cation of private information and of punishments. The trades that the planner chooses for pairwise meetings are restricted to be individually rational (IR), immune to cooperative defection by the pair in any meeting, and incentive compatible (IC ) for n people. At the transfer stage, transfers are subject to being IR and IC.
Several comments are in order about this notion of implementability. First, defection by an n-person has no further consequences for the person. Second, any defection by an m-person means permanent loss of m-status beginning at the next stage or date. The cooperative defection in meetings is static and assures only that the trade is in the pairwise core for the meeting taking as given the relevant continuation values. Moreover, as noted above, I am ruling out aggregative punishments in response to individual defections.
The planner's objective is ex ante expected utility, where is the probability of becoming an m-person and where the probabilities of starting with money are determined by ( m ; n ). 4 This notion of welfare is easily shown to be proportional to a weighted average of the surpluses in meetings; namely,
where y ss 0 is production and consumption when the producer is in state s and the consumer is in state s 0 and where
It follows that the …rst-best is u(y ) c(y )-namely, output equal to y in every (single-coincidence) meeting. Below, we express welfare as a fraction of that …rst-best welfare.
Optimal in ‡ation
In models with divisible money, a standard normalization holds the stock of money …xed and represents in ‡ation by a proportional tax on money holdings. The approach taken here is the same, except that the discreteness of money in the model-each person's money holding is constrained to be in the set f0; 1g-dictates that we use a probabilistic version of such a tax: a person who ends up after trade with a unit of money loses it with some probability. This way of modeling in ‡ation, which was …rst used by Victor Li (see [17] and [18] ) and has been used by others, has the same e¤ects on incentives to acquire money as in ‡ation in a model with divisible money. A literal interpretation is that money is made of stu¤ such that each unit disintegrates at each date with a probability that the planner chooses.
The following example is taken from Deviatov and Wallace [8] : u(y) = 1 e 10y , c(y) = y, K = 3, = :59, = 1=4. All the choices are arbitrary, except that for . It is chosen to satisfy two conditions on optima for 2 f0; 1g, the extreme situations with regard to monitoring. First, given the other aspects of the speci…cation, is such that if everyone is an m-person ( = 1), then the …rst best is implementable. In other words, only the presence of n-people prevents implementability of the …rst best. Second, if everyone is an n-person ( = 0), then it would be desirable to pay interest on money if doing so were feasible. Here are the details.
First consider = 1. This is an economy with no role for money and one in which punishment is permanent autarky for a defector. In it, output y in every single-coincidence meeting is implementable if and only if
or, equivalently,
Let y be the largest y for which (2) holds at equality. Then any y 2 [0; y] is implementable. The best implementable y is minfy ; yg. For our choice of u, c, and K, the smallest such that y y is t :51. Therefore, for our choice, = :59, the optimum is the …rst best if = 1. Now consider = 0. Then trade occurs only if the producer has no money and the consumer has money and optimal in ‡ation is zero. The relevant participation constraint is easily shown to be
Also, if y = y and n = 1=2 satisfy (3), then the optimum has y = y , n = 1=2, and ex ante welfare equal to 1=4 of the …rst best-1=4 because that is the fraction of single-coincidence meetings in which the producer has no money and the consumer has money when n = 1=2. (Obviously, n = 1=2 maximizes the fraction of singlecoincidence meetings in which the producer has no money and the consumer has money.) If not, then the optimum has y < y , n < 1=2, ex ante welfare less than 1=4 of the …rst best, and payment of interest on money would be desirable (if it were feasible). For our choice of u, c, and K, the smallest for which (3) holds with y = y and n = 1=2 is t :67. Thus, with = :59 (the mid-point between = :51 and = :67), it would be desirable to pay interest on money because doing so would loosen constraint (3). 5 With = 1=4, the optimum has ex ante welfare equal to 34% of the …rst best, has m = 1=4 (all the m-people have money), has n = :18 (only about one-quarter of the n-people have money), has a 16% in ‡ation (disintegration) rate, and has no transfers to n-people at the second stage. There are …ve meetings in which trade can occur (see Table 1 ). In the table, output is reported as a fraction of y and ( ) means a binding producer IR constraint. (Positive output in rows 3-5 implies that the pre-meeting welfare of an m-person is higher than that of an n-person with money, which, in turn, is higher than that of an n-person without money.) When the producer IR constraint is binding, the trade is that implied by a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er by the consumer. Given those binding IR constraints, it easy to see why output is lower in the last two rows than in the …rst two rows. In the …rst two rows, the binding defection payo¤ for the producer is the discounted value of entering the next date in state (n; 0); in the last two rows, it is the higher discounted value of entering the next date in state (n; 1). 6 And, even though the third-row trade does not have the m-person on the verge of defecting, a higher output in that meeting would decrease the discounted value of being in state (m; 1) and increase that of being in state (n; 0), and, thereby, lead to a violation of the IR constraints in all the other meetings.
Because only about one-quarter of the n-people have money, the in ‡ow of money into holdings by n-people (the second-row meeting) is roughly three times the out ‡ow (the fourth-row meeting). The in ‡ation reconciles those ‡ows with a constant n , while transfers at the second stage reconcile those ‡ows with a constant m . Here is one way to describe the transfers. The m-people could have a risk-sharing arrangement among themselves that has those who end stage-one with two units money surrender one unit with the proceeds distributed to those who end stage-1 without money. Given the above …rst-stage trades, transfers by the planner at each date are needed to reconcile those insurance payments with a constant m .
Optimal seasonal policy
In order to discuss seasonal policy, the setting is modi…ed so that it contains a deterministic seasonal (see Deviatov and Wallace [7] ). That is done by having a two-date periodic c function: at odd dates (winter), the disutility of production is higher than at even dates (summer). In other respects, the model is the same except that we now rule out in ‡ation (there is no possible disintegration of money) and we look for the best two-date periodic implementable allocation taking the …rst date to be winter. 7 Our example has = 1=4, K = 3, u(y) = 2y 1=2 , = :95, and
For this example, maximum surplus is attained at y = :8 in a winter meeting and at y = 1:25 in a summer meeting. 8 Also, …rst-best welfare is proportional to [:8 + (1:25)]. If everyone is monitored, then the …rst-best is implementable. And if no one is monitored, then the optimum is n = 1=2 at every date, output such that the maximum surplus is attained when the consumer has money and the producer does not, and welfare equal to 1=4 of …rst-best welfare. With = 1=4, the optimum is described in Tables 2 and 3 . Again, all the m-people have money at the start of each date and there are no transfers to n-people at the second stage of either date. Notice that the stock of money is larger at the start of winter than at the start of summer. The trades in meetings appear in Table 3. 7 See Cavalcanti and Nosal [4] for a similar background setting, but with only n-people. They permit random con…scation of money held by n-people, which is not allowed according to the notion of implementability used here. Whether their class of policies could instead be described as positive transfers and in ‡ation is not immediately apparent. 8 Although this example does not satisfy the boundedness requirement, it is easily amended to satisfy it in a way that does not a¤ect the optimum. One possibility is to assume that (4) holds only for y y, where y = 100y and that c(y) = 1 for y y. In the table, output at each date is expressed as a fraction of the respective …rst-best output, ( ) denotes a binding producer IR constraint, and ( y ) denotes a binding truth-telling constraint (the n-person with money is indi¤erent between the fourthrow trade and the third-row trade). When money transferred is in (0; 1), as in the second row, it is the probability that the consumer transfers 1 unit to the producer.
In order to interpret optimal intervention, we again focus on in ‡ows into and out ‡ows from money holdings of n people. In winter, the di¤erence is proportional to (:750 :312)(:505) :312(:813), which is negative. And, because there are no transfers to n-people at the second stage, those ‡ows imply that fewer n-people have money at the start of summer than at the start of winter (see Table 2 ). In summer, an exactly o¤setting net ‡ow occurs-a consequence of the restriction to two-date periodic allocations without in ‡ation. To reconcile those ‡ows with every m-person starting with money at every date, m-people in the aggregate surrender money at the beginning of summer and receive an exactly o¤setting amount at the beginning of winter. Those transfers can be interpreted as zero-interest loans: the loans are extended at the beginning of winter and are repaid at the beginning of summer. 
Concluding remarks
There are several attractive aspects of the model and examples: the model is built up from fundamental ideas about the role of money; it has endogenous taxation and endogenous division of the gains from trade in meetings; and the examples were not selected to produce particular outcomes. However, the model is very special in all sorts of ways.
People in the model meet in pairs to trade and meetings occur at random. As regards meetings in pairs, even if we set aside all the descriptions of absence-ofdouble-coincidence situations that presume such meetings, there are good reasons for using such models. Pairwise meetings are, of course, the standard model in labor economics. In addition, they have been used to study the following diverse topics in monetary economics, none of which are easily addressed in models in which trade occurs among a large group: ‡oat (see Wallace and Zhu [27] ), the denomination structure of currency (see Lee et. al. [16] ), coexistence of money and higher return assets (see Zhu and Wallace [28] ), and counterfeiting (see, for example, Hu [12] ). As regards randomness of meetings, such randomness is simple and could, at a small cost in terms of additional structure, be replaced by heterogeneous taste shocks.
Another special assumption is money holdings in f0; 1g. Such holdings do prejudice the result toward in ‡ation in the …rst example. If n-people were to spend more than they earn in meetings with m-people, then money would have to be returned to n-people as transfers. With holdings in f0; 1g, the transfers would have go to those who would otherwise have no money. Such transfers have harmful incentive e¤ects on n-people who are producers in meetings. If, instead, money holdings were richer, say f0; 1; 2; :::; Bg with B large, then such transfers could be paid in a way that approximates payment of interest on money held by n-people. Nevertheless, I am skeptical that an optimum in such a version would resemble the Friedman rule. Spending by m-people serves several purposes in the model. Therefore, taxing them by having them earn more than they spend in meetings is not costless in terms of welfare. 10 The assumption that an exogenous fraction are perfectly monitored is a special case of a model with a smooth distribution of costs of getting monitored across the population. In such a model, the planner chooses a cut-o¤ cost subject to people 10 A similar e¤ect on welfare appears in Antonol… et al [1] . They have a two-sector model in which m-people interact soley with each other in a Kehoe-Levine [19] credit market, while n-people interact solely with each other in a market with spot trade in money. As in our model, m-people face the threat of being banished into the set of n-people. In other respects, the models are very di¤erent. In our model, as highlighted above, the in-equilibrium interactions between m-people and n-people are central to the results.
self-selecting in accord with that cut-o¤. Some examples with such speci…cations were explored in Deviatov and Wallace [8] . It was found that the extreme version used above is not misleading. More interesting and challenging is a departure from the extreme situation of some perfectly monitored people and others not monitored at all. Some preliminary work on a model of that sort is in Mills [21] .
Of course, real business-cycle enthusiasts will notice that the seasonal example is a special case of a real business-cycle model. Nothing in principle prevents changing the model into one with a random process for the disutility of production. Such a model, but with only n-people, is studied in Cavalcanti and Erosa [3] and in Huang and Igarashi [13] .
One concern is that optima are di¢ cult to describe, or, in other words, that the model is intractable. That di¢ culty is due to a general feature of the model. The above examples are such that the optima at both extremes-either all m people or all n-people-are easy to describe because neither extreme has an endogenous state variable. The version with only m-people is a repeated game. The version with only n-people is also a repeated game, because, with money holdings in f0; 1g, the fraction who end the …rst stage with money is una¤ected by the …rst-stage trades. In contrast, a version with both types has an endogenous state variable: the distribution of money holdings between the two types. As a consequence, the trades at a date play two distinct roles: they a¤ect the current payo¤ (current trades) and they help to determine the distribution at the next date which matters for future payo¤s (future trades). That multiple role for trades, which is not special to models with trade in pairs, and the impossibility of attaining the …rst-best account for why the optimum is di¢ cult to describe.
There are well-known devices for eliminating that multiple role of trades. One is the so-called large family (for a recent example, see Gertler and Kiyotaki [10] ). Another is periodic centralized trade with quasi-linear preferences (see Lagos and Wright [15] and its many o¤shoots). But is it desirable to make such assumptions? If we conclude, as I believe we should, that the above multiple role of trades and the impossibility of attaining the …rst-best are features of almost all models of monetary economies, then we should live with those features and with the di¢ culty of describing their implications. Indeed, that di¢ culty is the message in the following sense. Optimal intervention, even its direction, depends on all the details of the model even in the very simple settings studied above.
